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Abstract 
We show that net equity payouts from the corporate sector play a crucial role in helping 
individuals manage their consumption path across the business cycle.  In particular, we 
show that, as investors desire to smooth consumption increases, optimal aggregate 
dividends become both more volatile and more counter-cyclical to help counterbalance 
pro-cyclical labor income.  These findings are robust to whether or not agency conflicts 
exist in the economy.  
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1 Introduction 
There is a disconnection between microeconomic and macroeconomic models of optimal 
dividend policy.  In the corporate finance literature, equity payout behavior at the individual 
firm level is either considered irrelevant (Miller and Modigliani, 1961) or depends on a range 
of company-specific issues including, inter alia, taxation, signalling and agency conflicts.1  
By contrast, in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, when the 
consumption requirement of the representative investor is modelled alongside the 
optimization problem of the corporate sector, an optimal aggregate dividend policy is 
frequently found to exist. 
In many settings, standard DSGE models predict that equity payout behavior at the 
portfolio level should be highly counter-cyclical; see, for example, the discussions in Liu and 
Miao (2015), Hirshleifer et al. (2015) and Huang-Meier et al. (2015).  This is because, when 
economic times are good, companies have excellent investment opportunities and therefore 
wish to retain cash for new projects.  Simultaneously, individuals have little requirement for 
additional revenue as their labor income is highly pro-cyclical.  The low demand from 
households for income from financial assets, and the high demand for new investment from 
corporations, leads to predicted low dividend payments in economic booms.   
This theoretical prediction, though, clearly conflicts with observed financial market 
behavior.  Jermann and Quadrini (2012) report a correlation of +41% between gross equity 
payouts and GDP while Huang-Meier et al. (2015) report a correlation of +50% between real 
aggregate dividends changes and real GDP growth.  Even net dividends, which comprise of 
gross dividends minus new equity issue and share repurchases, are not highly counter-
cyclical in the manner that is predicted by most DSGE models.
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To overcome this anomaly, a number of papers force the pro-cyclicality of equity 
payouts onto their economies by modelling dividends as a levered claim to consumption; see, 
for example, Bansal and Yaron (2004), Ju and Miao (2012) and Liu and Miao (2015).  But 
this does little to explain the underlying reason for this relationship.  Both Hirshleifer et al. 

1 Dividend policy work in the corporate finance literature has incorporated different corporate accounting and 
finance issues, such as taxation (Brennan, 1970; Miller and Scholes, 1978; Poterba and Summers, 1985; and 
Harris et al., 2001), dividend clientele effects (Pettit, 1977), agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; and La Porta et al., 2000), asymmetric information and signalling (Miller and 
Rock, 1985; DeAngelo et al., 1996; Benartzi et al., 1997; Dong et al., 2005; and Fuller and Goldstein, 2011), 
and the bird-in-the-hand fallacy (Bhattacharya, 1979).  For reviews of firm-level payout policy, see, for example, 
Allen and Michaely (2003), Brav et al. (2005), and Ben-David (2010).   
2For instance, Covas and Den Haan (2011) find the correlation between net dividend payments and GDP to be 
in the range of -33% and +54% depending on the firm size.  In this paper, we report a correlation of -20% 
between net aggregate equity payouts and GDP. 
3 

(2015) and Huang-Meier et al. (2015), by contrast, make dividends more pro-cyclical 
endogenously by incorporating capital adjustment costs into their economic models.  This 
makes firms less willing to retain capital in good times, thus releasing more money for 
distribution amongst shareholders.  Huang-Meier et al. (2015), following Carceles-Poveda 
(2005, 2009), also endogenize pro-cyclical dividends through a model with agency conflicts, 
where managers own reward function makes them averse to volatility in dividend payments.  
Other approaches have also been suggested.  Liu and Miao (2015) argue that incorporating 
leverage allows firms to raise capital in strong conditions through debt, reducing the need to 
cut dividends at such times.  Hirshleifer et al. (2015) note that the combined effect of 
extrapolation bias, capital adjustment costs, and recursive preference incorporated into the 
modelled economy may potentially help to reconcile consumption and dividend behavior. 
These explanations, though, all focus on the production side of the economy, with 
little consideration given as to how investor preferences might affect the relationship between 
the business cycle and the payout policy of firms.  Since the predicted strong counter-
cyclicality of dividend payments in standard DSGE models emerges as much from the low 
marginal utility of consumption in strong economic conditions as it does from better 
investment opportunities for the corporate sector, this is an important gap in the literature that 
we attempt to fill here.  Our study, therefore, follows closely in the spirit of Marsh and 
Mertons (1987, p. 4-5) observation that: In a purely demand-driven model for dividends, the 
demand for dividends is not firm-specific because investors only care about the dividend-
capital gain mix at the aggregate level... Thus equilibrium aggregate dividends may be 
determinate, but which firms service this demand and the quantity that each chooses to 
supply may not.   
Within our model, the representative household derives income for consumption from 
three sources; salary, changes in the level of lending provided to firms alongside the 
associated interest payments made on existing corporate debt, and cash payouts to equity.  To 
capture the desire of the household to smooth consumption over time, we concentrate on 
internal habit formation utility functions.  As has been widely documented elsewhere (e.g., 
Constantinides, 1990), we find that, as the habit motive strengthens, the optimal consumption 
path becomes less volatile.  More importantly, our study documents that this effect is not 
driven equally by all three components of income.  For example, if we incorporate agency 
conflicts into our model, investors income from debt is (approximately) uncorrelated with 
output for all levels of habit formation.  Changes in lending practice, therefore, are not used 
by investors as a mechanism to aid in consumption smoothing.  Furthermore, in a world with 
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no agency conflicts, labor income becomes both more pro-cyclical and more volatile as the 
habit motive rises; a result that is counterintuitive. 
By contrast, we demonstrate that dividend payments at the portfolio level play a vital 
role in helping individuals to manage their consumption paths across the business cycle, with 
optimal aggregate equity payout behavior being highly sensitive to the strength of investors 
desire to smooth consumption over time.  This result holds both in the presence and absence 
of agency conflicts.  This is our central contribution.   
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present our baseline theoretical model, 
which excludes agency conflicts.  We describe the optimization problems of the 
representative household and the firms within the economy.  We also describe how 
bankruptcy can occur within our framework and the impact this has on the corporate 
borrowing rate.  After deriving the equilibrium and describing both the market clearing 
conditions and our choice of parameter values, we present our main results.  These clearly 
show the sensitivity of optimal aggregate dividend policy to investor preferences, and 
illustrate the way in which aggregate equity payouts play a vital role in helping investors to 
smooth consumption.  In Section 3, we turn to a model where managers maximize their own 
utility function rather than that of their shareholders.  Our central findings are largely 
unchanged from the baseline model.  Section 4 compares the implications of our models with 
the observed behavior of the US economy.  This supports our theoretical results that the 
cyclical variations in dividend behavior, consumption behavior and labor income are 
correlated.  Section 5 provides some concluding comments. 
2 The value-maximizing model (VM) 
In this section we describe our main DSGE model, which is an extension of earlier seminal 
work by Kydland and Prescott (1982), Hansen (1985), and others.  Our paper lies within the 
stream of theoretical studies that explicitly incorporate equity payouts for the representative 
firm.  While this has been a feature in a number of previous studies, this is either often not the 
central focus of their work (for example, Baxter et al., 1998; Alessandrini, 2003), or the point 
of interest differs significantly from the purpose of this study (for example, Levy and 
Hennessy, 2007; Covas and Den Haan, 2011; Jermann and Quadrini, 2012).   
The most closely related previous studies to this are those by Carceles-Poveda (2009), 
Liu and Miao (2015), Hirshleifer et al. (2015), and Huang-Meier et al. (2015).  Carceles-
Poveda (2009) considers risk-averse firms in the DSGE model and shows that this feature 
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contributes to the explanation of the behavior of stock returns and macroeconomic aggregates 
in incomplete markets.  Liu and Miao (2015) study the effect of the investors generalized 
disappointment aversion preferences on equity returns when the production economy is set to 
include leverage with a pro-cyclical dividend process.  Hirshleifer et al. (2015) explain 
stylized facts about business cycles by using a DSGE model with recursive preferences when 
considering that individuals are likely to overextrapolate future performance from past 
performance of a small sample.  Huang-Meier et al. (2015) focus on the pro-cyclical behavior 
of gross dividend payouts when low elasticity of investment is endogenized.  The authors 
find that the role of agency conflicts in the real business cycle models is important as it 
explains pro-cyclical dividend payout behavior better than the presence of capital adjustment 
costs.    
2. 1 The economic environment 
We assume that there are a large number of firms that all experience the same technology 
shocks as well as idiosyncratic capital shocks, one representative household and one 
representative bank. Equilibrium is reached when each is simultaneously able to maximize its 
individual objective function subject to budget and market clearing constraints. 
2.1.1 The household’s problem 
The representative households preferences are captured by a time-inseparable utility function 
that includes consumption and leisure:  
where ߚ is the subjective discount factor, ݑሺڄሻ is the period utility function for consumption 
and leisure, ܿ௧ା௛ is the level of consumption at time ݐ ൅ ݄, ݈௦ is the number of hours worked 
in the labor market and the total number of hours available is normalized to one. The ݏ 
superscript here refers to the fact that this is the supply of labor, which is to be distinguished 
from the firms demand for labor, ݈ௗ.  This results in 	 ? െ ௧ା௛௦  being available for leisure at 
time ݐ ൅ ݄.  That the utility function for time ݐ ൅ ݄ includes consumption at time ݐ ൅ ݄ െ 	 ? 
reflects internal habit formation.  While this preference characteristic has featured in a 
number of previous DSGE models (see, for example, Constantinides, 1990; Carroll, 2000;  
Boldrin et al., 2001; Seckin, 2001; Otrok et al., 2002; Gershun, 2010), these earlier studies do 
not consider optimal aggregate dividend policy, which is our focus here. 
 ෍ߚ௛ݑሺܿ௧ା௛ǡ ܿ௧ା௛ିଵǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈ା௛௦ ሻஶ௛ୀ଴  (1)
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In order to maximize its expected lifetime utility, at ݐ the household can choose the 
current level of consumption and the amount of labor that it agrees to supply to the corporate 
sector.  In addition, there are capital markets that allow the household to adjust its 
consumption profile across time.  In particular, it can purchase ݊௧  shares in an aggregate of 
firms and hold ܾ௧ு  in a risk-free bank deposit account over the interval [ݐǡ ݐ ൅ 	?].  The 
representative agents optimization problem at time ݐ therefore becomes:  
 
subject to the budget constraint  
where ݍ௧ is the share price of the representative firm at time ݐ, ݊௧ is the number of shares held 
by the representative investor at time ݐ, ݓ௧  is the wage rate for labor, and ݀௧denotes the 
dividends paid by firms. ௙ܴ௧ିଵ represents the gross risk-free rate for the period [ݐ െ 	 ?ǡ ݐ], 
which is determined endogenously (details in the Appendix 1).  We denote the labor salary by ݏ௧ ൌ ݓ௧݈௧௦. 
The habit formation utility function that we use throughout this paper is:  
The household utility is determined by the multiplied effect of consumption and leisure, 
where ߩ captures the relative weight placed on consumption against leisure. ߦ captures the 
strength of habits for household consumption and ߛ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
The multiplicative functional form for habit formation is commonly used in DSGE modelling; 
see Campbell (1994) and Dennis (2009) for consumption habits in a real business cycle 
model and in a New Keynesian business cycle model respectively. 
We restrict our analysis to internal habit formation with respect to single-period 
lagged consumption.  This is for two reasons.   First, and most importantly, it simplifies the 
exposition.  Second, Fuhrer (2000) empirically tests persistence in the internal habit-
formation reference level and found that the habit stock prior to time t-1 has little influence 
on overall utility.  We conjecture that our results would, though, extend beyond this simple 
 ௖೟ǡ௟೟ೞǡ௡೟ǡ௕೟ಹ෍ߚ௛ݑሺܿ௧ା௛ǡ ܿ௧ା௛ିଵǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈ା௛௦ ሻஶ௛ୀ଴  (2)
 ܿ௧ ൅ ݍ௧݊௧ାଵ ൅ ܾ௧ு ൑ ݓ௧݈௧௦ ൅ ሺݍ௧ ൅ ݀௧ሻ݊௧ ൅ ௙ܴ௧ିଵܾ௧ିଵு  (3)
 ݑሺܿ௧ ǡ ܿ௧ିଵǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈ሻ ൌ ሾሺܿ௧ െ ߦ ܿ௧ିଵሻఘ ሺ	 ? െ ௧݈ሻଵିఘ ሿଵିఊ	 ? െ ߛ  (4)
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framework.  This is because both internal habit models with longer lagged reference periods 
(Constantinides, 1990; Fuhrer, 2000) and Keeping up with the Joneses external habit 
models (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999; Lettau and Uhlig, 2000) lead to smoother optimal 
consumption paths than the no-habit case.  Since habit formation is used within this 
framework as a mechanism for adjusting the investors desire to smooth consumption, similar 
effects could be generated from a wide range of habit formation models.  Investigating the 
precise empirical effects of different specifications would be a fruitful area for future research.   
2.1.2 The production sector in a frictionless economy 
The economy that we consider consists of a large number ܰ of individual firms.  These 
experience an identical technology shock each period as well as an idiosyncratic shock to 
their capital and earnings base.  In conjunction with corporate borrowing, the idiosyncratic 
shocks can lead to bankruptcy at the individual firm level but not at the aggregate level.  In 
this subsection, we consider the behavior of the economy in the absence of idiosyncratic 
shocks, which are then introduced below.  This simplification allows us to begin to model the 
economy as if there were a single representative firm, denoted by a superscript ݎ. 
The output, ݕ௧௥ of the representative firm at time ݐ is given by a constant returns-to-
scale Cobb-Douglas production function:  
where ݇௧௥, ݈௧ௗ and ݖ௧ denote the capital employed by the firm, the labor employed by the firm 
and a labor augmenting technological shock respectively, while ߙ is the output elasticity of 
capital. The technical change is assumed to follow a first order autoregressive process in logs: 
where ߰ is the parameter of persistence and ߳௧ is an independently and identically normally 
distributed random variable; ߳௧	?ܰሺ	?ǡ ߪఢଶሻ .  The capital base of the representative firm 
evolves according to:  
where ݅௧௥  represents net investment by the firm at time ݐ  and ߟ  denotes the fixed capital 
depreciation rate.  In addition to equity, the firm can augment its capital base by borrowing an 
 ݕ௧௥ ൌ ሺ݇௧ିଵ௥ ሻఈ൫ݖ௧݈௧ௗ൯ଵିఈ (5)
 ݈݋݃ݖ௧ ൌ ݈߰݋݃ ݖ௧ିଵ ൅ ߳௧ (6)
 ݇௧௥ ൌ ݅௧௥ ൅ ሺ	 ? െ ߟሻ݇௧ିଵ௥ ǡ 	 ? ൏ ߟ ൏ 	 ? (7)
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amount ܾ௧ିଵ for the interval [ݐ െ 	 ?ǡ ݐ] at a gross corporate interest rate  ܴ௧ିଵ ൒ ௙ܴ௧ିଵ.3  It is 
assumed that the firm pays corporation tax at a fixed rate ߬ and that the interest payment at 
time ݐ, ሺܴ௧ିଵ െ 	 ?ሻܾ௧ିଵǡ is tax-deductible.  Therefore, the free cash flow of the firm before 
accounting for investments is given by:  
Net investment in the firm, ݅௧ , is generated from this profit, ߨ௧௥ , the net cash flow from 
paying off last periods debt and re-borrowing this period, ܾ௧ െ ܾ௧ିଵ, minus any dividend 
paid, ݀௧௥.  This results in:  
It is important to stress that dividends are not a residual within this framework.  
While standard accounting equalities between gross dividends, free cash flow, investment, 
capital structure choices, and net new capital inflows apply, the general equilibrium setting 
means that these variables are determined simultaneously.  That there are both corporate 
taxes and bankruptcy frictions (see below) leads, in the manner of Modigliani and Miller 
(1963), to an optimal capital structure while the investment levels of firms are jointly 
determined by the corporate opportunities available and investors desire for the income 
stream provided by dividends.      
2.1.3 The presence of bankruptcy 
In addition to the aggregate labor-augmenting technology shock, each firm experiences an 
individual shock.  We define the earnings before interest and tax for the representative firm as ܧܤܫ ௧ܶ௥ ൌ ݕ௧௥ െݓ௧݈௧ௗ .   Each of the ܰ  individual firms then experiences a firm-specific 
idiosyncratic shock to its earnings and capital base.  For firm ݊  at time ݐ , ܧܤܫ ௡ܶ௧ ൌߜ௡௧ܧܤܫ ௧ܶ௥   and ݇௡௧ ൌ ߜ௡௧݇௧௥ , where ߜ௡௧  is an independent drawing from the probability 
density function ݂ሺߜሻ supported on the strictly positive real line Ըା.  This differs from the 
financial shock in Jermann and Quadrini (2012) which is identical across firms.  The 
consequence of this is that any individual firm will not be able to pay off its debt if ߜ௡௧ାଵሾܧܤܫ ௧ܶାଵ௥ ൅ ሺ	 ? െ ߟሻ݇௧௥ሿ ൏ ܴ௧ܾ௧.  This bankruptcy condition for firm ݊ can be re-written 
as ߜ௡௧ାଵ ൏ ݔ௧ାଵ where  

3Since the theoretical setting of our paper allows for a mixed debt-and-equity funding structure for the firm, this 
study is also loosely related to the body of work that considers capital structure choices across business cycles.  
This has been considered by, amongst others, Levy and Hennessy (2007), Covas and Den Haan (2011) and 
Jermann and Quadrini (2012). 
 ߨ௧௥ ൌ ሺ	? െ ߬ሻሺݕ௧௥ െݓ௧݈௧ௗ െ ሺܴ௧ିଵ െ 	 ?ሻܾ௧ିଵሻ (8)
 
݅௧௥ ൌ ሺ	 ? െ ሻ߬൫ݕ௧௥ െݓ௧݈௧ௗ െ ሺܴ௧ିଵ െ 	 ?ሻܾ௧ିଵ൯ ൅ ܾ௧ െ ܾ௧ିଵ െ ݀௧௥ฺ݀௧௥ ൌ ሺ	 ? െ ሻ߬൫ݕ௧௥ െݓ௧݈௧ௗ െ ܴ௧ିଵܾ௧ିଵ൯ െ ߬ ܾ௧ିଵ ൅ ܾ௧ െ ݅௧௥  (9)
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As the overall number of firms in the economy is large, the proportion of firms in bankruptcy, Ȟ௧, is given by  
To operationalize this setting, we set ݂ሺߜሻ to be a rectangular distribution on the interval ሾܷǡ ܮሿ:  
resulting in Ȟ௧ ൌ ሺݔ௧ െ ܮሻȀሺܷ െ ܮሻ.   
This risk of bankruptcy introduces several frictions into the economy. First, we 
assume that aggregate investment, dividends and new capital within the economy are all 
reduced on a pro-rata basis with the proportion of firms who become bankrupt when 
compared to the representative firm case: ݅௧ ൌ ሺ	 ? െ Ȟ௧ሻ݅௧௥ , ݀௧ ൌ ሺ	 ? െ Ȟ௧ሻ݀௧௥ , and ݇௧ ൌሺ	 ? െ Ȟ௧ሻ݇௧௥.  In addition, we assume that aggregate output is reduced by earnings adjusted for 
both the proportion of firms who go bankrupt and the monetary recovery rate ߠ  from 
bankruptcy:  
In light of these frictions, the objective of the firms managers in this baseline model is to 
maximize shareholder wealth, or equivalently the expected present value of future dividend 
payments.  They have three control variables to enable them to do this; labor, capital 
employed and how much borrowing is raised: ݈௧ௗ ǡ ݇௧ ǡ ܾ௧ .  Let ܯ௧ǡ௛  denote the stochastic 
discount factor of the representative household at time ݐ for horizon ݄.  The optimization 
problem then facing the firms managers is: 
2.1.4 The banking sector 
The final impact of bankruptcy on our economy is that it influences the corporate bond 
premium, ܴ௧ െ ௙ܴ௧ .  There is a neutral banking sector that balances the savings of the 
representative household with the borrowing demands of the ܰ individual firms.  Since there 
 ݔ௧ାଵ ൌ ܾ௧ܴ௧ܧܤܫ ௧ܶାଵ௥ ൅ ሺ	 ? െ ߟሻ݇௧௥ (10)
 Ȟ௧ ൌ න ݂ሺߜሻ݀ߜ௫೟଴ (11)
 ݂ሺߜሻ ൝	? 	? ൏ ߜ ൏ ܮand    ܷ ൏ ߜ ൏ 	 ?	?ܷ െ ܮ  ߜ א ሾܮǡ ܷሿ  (12)
 ݕ௧ ൌ ݕ௧௥ െ ሺ	 ? െ ߠሻȞ௧ܧܤܫ ௧ܶ௥ (13)
 ௟೟೏ǡ௞೟ǡ௕೟ ݀௧ ൅ ܧ௧ൣ	? ܯ௧ǡ௛݀௧ା௛ஶ௛ୀଵ ൧  (14)
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are a large number of companies, the bank can construct a well-diversified portfolio of the 
debt of the aggregate of firms.  While this is subject to the labor-augmenting technology 
shock, the proportion of firms going bankrupt is known with certainty each period and 
therefore the cash flows to the bank are non-stochastic.  As a consequence, it only requires 
the risk-free rate of return on its overall aggregate portfolio of holdings. 
For the portion of the firms that do not go bankrupt, 	 ? െ Ȟ௧, the bank fully recovers all 
the capital that it is owed, ܾ௧ܴ௧ .  For the bankrupt firms, the bank experiences different 
frictions to the overall economy by losing a proportion 	 ? െ ߠ of the money that is available 
for recovery.  The relationship between ܴ௧ and ௙ܴ௧ is then given by: 
By substituting the rectangular probability distribution function ݂ሺߜሻ into eq. (15), the bank 
can set the corporate interest rate, conditional on knowing the level of debt and the risk-free 
interest rate, through the relationship:  
Based on the calibrations described below, the optimal debt/equity mix in our economy 
appears realistic; the steady state leverage value of  ܾ௧Ȁሺܾ௧ ൅ ݍ௧ሻ ൌ 	?	?	?.  This leads to very 
low bankruptcy risk and so ܴ௧ െ 	 ? is very close to ௙ܴ௧ െ 	 ?, with steady state values of 	?Ǥ	?	?	? 
and 	?Ǥ	?	?	? respectively. 
2.1.5 Determining the equilibrium 
To determine the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium, we solve the firms and the 
households optimization problems; eqs (2) and (14).  We show in Appendix 1 that this 
results in five equilibrium conditions:  
 ܾ௧ܴ௧ሺ	? െ Ȟ௧ሻ ൅ ߠሺܧܤܫ ௧ܶାଵ௥ ൅ ሺ	 ? െ ߟሻ݇௧ሻන ߜ݂ሺߜሻ݀ߜ ൌ ܾ௧ ௙ܴ௧௫೟శభ଴  (15)
 ܴ௧ ൌ ൜ܾ௧ ௙ܴ௧ െ ߠ	?ሺܷ െ ܮሻ ൣܧܤܫ ௧ܶାଵఊ ൅ ሺ	 ? െ ߟሻ݇௧൧ ሾݔ௧ାଵଶ െ ܮଶሿ ൠ ܷ െ ܮܾ௧ሺܷ െ ݔ௧ାଵሻ (16)
 ሺ	 ? െ ߙሻ ݕ௧݈௧ ൌ െ ߲ݑሺܿ௧ ǡ ܿ௧ିଵǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈௦ሻ߲݈௧௦߲ݑሺܿ௧ ǡ ܿ௧ିଵǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈௦ሻ߲ܿ௧ ൅ ߚ ߲ݑሺܿ௧ାଵǡ ܿ௧ ǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈ାଵ௦ ሻ߲ܿ௧  (17)
 	? ൌ ܧ௧ሾܯ௧ǡଵ ௙ܴ௧ሿ (18)
 ௙ܴ௧ ൌ ሺ	 ? െ ሻ߬ߙ݇௧ఈିଵሺݖ௧ାଵ݈௧ାଵሻଵିఈ ൅ 	 ? െ ߟ (19)
 ܴ௧ ൌ ൬ 	?	 ? െ ൰߬ ൣ ௙ܴ௧ െ ߬൧ (20)
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From the banking sector, we have another two conditions (eqs (10) and (16)). 
The next step is to obtain market clearing conditions. This economy begins with a 
capital stock ݇௧ ൐ 	 ? and an initial level of the productivity shock ݖ௧ ൐ 	 ?. In equilibrium, 
consumption, capital, and labor need to be determined simultaneously.  For the market to 
clear, four conditions must hold: aggregate borrowing must equal aggregate lending, ܾ௧ு ൌ ܾ௧, 
the equity market must clear, ݊௧ ൌ 	 ?, the labor market must clear, ݈௧ௗ ൌ ݈௧௦ ൌ ݈௧ , and the 
goods market must clear, ݕ௧ ൌ ݅௧ ൅ ܿ௧. 
2.2 Calibration 
Most values we used for our parameters are standard and borrowed from Alessandrini (2003); 
see Table 1. The constant capital share in a Cobb-Douglas production function, ߙ, is set to 
0.35. The quarterly capital depreciation rate, ߟ , is 0.019. The quarterly intertemporal 
subjective time discount factor ߚ  is set to 0.99.  The persistence of the idiosyncratic 
technology shock, ߰, is given a value of 0.95.  The standard deviation of the idiosyncratic 
shock is assumed to be 0.00712. The recovery rate, ߠ, and tax rate, ߬, are assigned values of 
0.92 and 6% respectively.   
[Table 1] 
We select values for ܷ and ܮ of 1.225 and 0.475. In the momentary utility function, 
we set ߩ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?	? following Campbell (1994).4  The coefficient of relative risk aversion for the 
representative investors utility function, ߛ, is set to 2. The habit persistence level, ߦ, ranges 
from 0 to 0.8. 
2.3 Results 
Our results for the value-maximizing economy are reported in Tables 2 and 3.  The former 
presents a summary of the mean and the relative standard deviations (RSD) of each 
macroeconomic variable.
5
  The latter presents the correlation of different macroeconomic 
variables with consumption, dividend and output.   
[Table 2] 
[Table 3] 

4 Campbell (1994) sets a value of labor as 0.33 and then obtains the value of the fraction of time devoted to 
market activities. Our model shows a steady state value of labor as 0.32 (ߦ ൌ 	 ?) and 0.33 (ߦ ൌ 	 ?Ǥ	 ?). 
5 Relative standard deviation is each variables standard deviations divided by its mean value. It is also known 
as the coefficient of variation. 
 ݍ௧ ൌ ܧ௧ൣܯ௧ǡଵሺݍ௧ାଵ ൅ ݀௧ାଵሻ൧ (21)
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 Panel A of Table 2 shows the estimated steady-state first moment of each variable.  
This simulation confirms that the no-trend optimal aggregate dividends are positive and 
insensitive to the level of habit persistence (ߦ). The ratio of the aggregate dividends to salary 
(݀Ȁݏ) is 0.0102 (ൌ 	?Ǥ	?	?Ȁ	?Ǥ	?	?ሻ meaning that investors get 99% of their income from salary 
and 1% from dividends.  The aggregate dividendsconsumption ratio (݀Ȁܿ ) is 0.0989 
(ൌ 	?Ǥ	?	?Ȁ	?Ǥ	?	?ሻ implying that dividends contribute 10% of investors consumption.  It is also 
worth noting that the consumptionsalary ratioሺܿȀݏ) is 0.1029 (ൌ 	?Ǥ	?	?Ȁ	?Ǥ	?	?ሻ, indicating 
ten per cent of salary goes to investors consumption.   
As the level of habit persistence (ߦ) increases from 0 to 0.8, the RSD of aggregate 
consumption in Panel B of Table 2 declines from 0.30 to 0.21.  That consumption growth 
becomes smoother with increased habit motive is consistent with previous research (see, e.g., 
Constantinides, 1990) and this is the central feature that we capture by incorporating habit 
formation utility into our economy.  In addition, the pro-cyclicality of consumption, ܿ݋ݎݎሺݕ௧ ǡ ܿ௧ሻ reported in Table 3, becomes less pronounced as the habit motive increases. 
How is this consumption smoothing brought about?  Consumption comes from three 
sources; salary, dividend payments and changes in holding of the risk-free asset after interest 
has been paid.  Salaries, which are positively correlated with output in all cases because both 
the wage rate rises (ܿ݋ݎݎሺݕ௧ ǡ ݓ௧ሻ ൐ 	 ?) and people work longer hours (ܿ݋ݎݎሺݕ௧ ǡ ݈௧ሻ ൐ 	 ?) in 
benign economic conditions, become both more volatile and more pro-cyclical as the habit 
motive gets stronger.  As ߦ  increases from 0 to 0.8, the relative standard deviation of ݏ௧ 
increases from 3.17 to 4.03 while ܿ݋ݎݎሺݕ௧ ǡ ݏ௧ሻ rises from 0.84 to 0.90.  Therefore, somewhat 
counter-intuitively, salary effects magnify both the volatility and pro-cyclicality of 
consumption growth as the habit motive increases.  The observed increased level of 
consumption smoothing with higher ߦ must then be driven instead by cash flows associated 
with financial assets.  Consistent with this, bond holding is pro-cyclical in all cases, so 
consumption is smoothed to some extent by increasing (decreasing) lending in good (bad) 
economic conditions.  As ߦ increases from 0 to 0.8, ܿ݋ݎݎሺݕ௧ ǡ ܾ௧ሻ rises from 0.37 to 0.44 and 
the relative standard deviation of bond holdings increases from 0.19 to 0.22.  This does 
reduce the volatility and pro-cyclicality of consumption as expected.   
In addition, optimal dividend behavior is highly sensitive to the assumed level of habit 
formation.  As ߦ increases from 0 to 0.8, so the RSD of dividends increases from 2.44 to 3.21 
and the payments become more counter-cyclical; ܿ݋ݎݎሺݕ௧ ǡ ݀௧ሻ increases in absolute terms 
from 0.71 to 0.85.  This is clearly significantly impacting upon the ability of the 
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representative agent to smooth consumption.   This is further illustrated by Fig. 1, where the 
ratio ߪௗȀߪ௖ for values of ߦ א ሼ	 ?ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ	 ?Ǥ	 ?ሽ is plotted.  
[Figure 1] 
This figure shows that, in aggregate, the relative standard deviation of dividends to 
consumption rises dramatically as the habit motive becomes large.  Counter-cyclical 
dividends are offsetting pro-cyclical salary to reduce the consumption volatility of the 
representative investor. 
An alternate way of illustrating this effect is by examining the correlations of 
consumption with its three individual sources.  In all cases, consumption is positively 
correlated with salary but negatively correlated with the cash flows from risk-free investment 
and the equity market.
6
  However, as the habit motive becomes more intense, the strong 
positive relation with salary becomes noticeably weaker.  By reducing the reliance of 
consumption on salary, dividends help reduce both consumptions volatility and pro-
cyclicality. 
Figs 2 and 3 respectively illustrate the impulse responses of the expected future path 
of aggregate dividends and consumption in two cases, without habit formationሺߦ ൌ 	?) and 
with strong habit formation ( ߦ ൌ 	 ?Ǥ	 ?). These response functions further indicate that 
consumption growth is smoother when habit persistence is higher. Consumption with the 
highest habit motive of ߦ ൌ 	 ?Ǥ	 ? has low deviations (far below 0.001) in the first few quarters 
after the shock.  This contrasts with the no-habit motive case, ߦ ൌ 	 ?, when the deviation is 
higher than 0.002. The figures further show that aggregate dividends fluctuate more in the 
habit formation case than in the no-habit formation case. Notice, for example, that the first 
ten quarters deviation from the steady state after the shock is between െ	?x	?	?ିଷ  and െ	?x	?	?ିଷ  for the no-habit-motive-investor economy, yet is higher than െ	?x	?	?ିଷ  for the 
with-high-habit-motive-investor economy. 
[Figure 2] 
[Figure 3] 
Aggregate investment, ݅௧, has similar characteristics to ݀௧ both with and without habit, 
in terms of its volatility and the absolute levels of its correlations with consumption and 
income.  In particular, the optimal investment path becomes more volatile as the habit motive 

6  Remember that ܾ௧  is the level of bank lending.  So, if ܿ݋ݎݎሺܿ௧ ǡ ܾ௧ሻ  is positive, then there is a negative 
correlation between cash taken from the risk-free asset and the level of economic activity.   
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increases and investment volatility is close to aggregate payout volatility in each of the 
different habit persistence cases.  As investors habit motive gets stronger, firms must adapt 
their own investment plans to ensure that they help maximize the expected utility of the agent. 
The correlation between investment and consumption also decreases as the latter is smoothed, 
which is consistent with the absolute relationship between dividends and consumption.  
Investment is nearly perfectly correlated with output for all values of ߦ because of the high 
persistence of technology change; ߰ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?	?.  High output this year signals high future 
profitability, giving firms a strong incentive to increase investment levels.   
In this general equilibrium setting, the habit motive of investors is shown to have a 
significant influence not only on investors labor and consumption decisions but also on the 
investment, financing and payout policy of the firm.  This suggests that there is a significant 
interaction between corporate policy and investor utility.  However, there is one implication 
of this model that appears to be at odds with the observed empirical data. In this baseline case, 
dividends are predicted to be highly counter-cyclical in each calibration.  As we discussed in 
the introduction, this is a feature common of many DSGE studies and makes dividends a 
highly suitable control variable for smoothing investor consumption across the business cycle.  
However, this finding is inconsistent with observed cyclicality of both gross and net 
aggregate payout behavior.   
To overcome this anomaly, we follow an approach employed by both Carceles-
Poveda (2009) and Huang-Meier et al. (2015), which is to introduce agency conflicts into the 
model.  This has similar implications for dividend behavior to economies with capital 
adjustment costs, but Huang-Meier et al. (2015) argue that agency models better explain 
observed market behavior.  The results in these studies are also qualitatively comparable to 
those of Jermann and Quadrini (2012) who have suggested a relatively complex DSGE model 
with both frictions and shocks. 
3 Risk-averse firms (RA) 
Following Radner (1970), Sandmo (1971) and Leland (1972), in this section we assume that 
the firms managers maximize their own utility function rather than working in their 
shareholders best interests.  In this risk-averse firms model (RA), managers have risk-averse 
utility with respect to future dividends (݀௧) and thus optimize: 
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where ߛி  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion of the manager and ߶  denotes the 
managers time discount factor. Carceles-Poveda (2005, 2009) contend that this risk-aversion 
assumption improves our understanding of managers behavior.  Huang-Meier et al. (2015) 
also show that such models significantly change the optimal correlation between dividends 
and output.  We extend their findings here to a mixed equity and debt environment in the 
presence of habit formation.   
We show in Appendix 3 that solving the household and the firms optimization 
problem (eqs (2) and (31)) gives a set of five equilibrium conditions for the RA case:  
 
In equilibrium, the above eqs (23) to (27) must hold together with the bank sector (eqs (10) 
and (16)) and market clearing conditions (ܾ௧ு ൌ ܾ௧, ݊௧ ൌ 	 ?, ݈௧ௗ ൌ ݈௧௦ ൌ ݈௧, and ݕ௧ ൌ ݅௧ ൅ ܿ௧). 
To calibrate the RA model, we set ߶ equal to 0.99 and ߛி equal to 1.44, where these 
choices follow Carceles-Poveda (2003).  Other parameters remain the same as reported in 
Table 1. 
Table 4 displays the results of the mean in Panel A and the RSD in Panel B for each 
variable.  We notice that the ratio of the positive optimal aggregated dividends to salary (݀Ȁݏ) 
is slightly higher in the RA model than in the VM model. The figure 0.0217 (ൌ 	?Ǥ	?	?Ȁ	?Ǥ	?	?ሻ 
implies that agency conflicts bring more dividends to investors income.  This result is 
broadly consistent with the Jensen free cash-flow hypothesis that firms will hold lower levels 
of cash in the presence of agency conflicts.  The no-trend optimal aggregated dividends to 
consumption ratio in the RA model is similar to the VM model while the variances of optimal 
 ௟೟೏ǡ௞೟ǡ௕೟ ܧ௧ ൤	? ߶௛ஶ௛ୀଵ ௗ೟శ೓భషംಷିଵଵିఊಷ ൨  (22)
 ሺ	 ? െ ߙሻ ݕ௧݈௧ ൌ െ ߲ݑሺܿ௧ ǡ ܿ௧ିଵǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈௦ሻ߲݈௧௦߲ݑሺܿ௧ ǡ ܿ௧ିଵǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈௦ሻ߲ܿ௧ ൅ ߚ ߲ݑሺܿ௧ାଵǡ ܿ௧ ǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈ାଵ௦ ሻ߲ܿ௧  (23)
 	 ? ൌ ߶ܧ௧ ቈ൬ ݀௧݀௧ାଵ൰ఊಷ ௙ܴ௧቉ (24)
 ௙ܴ௧ ൌ ሺ	 ? െ ሻ߬ߙ݇௧ఈିଵሺݖ௧ାଵ݈௧ାଵሻଵିఈ ൅ 	 ? െ ߟ (25)
 ௙ܴ௧ ൌ ሺ	 ? െ ሻܴ߬௧ ൅ ߬ ֜ ܴ௧ ൌ ൬ 	?	 ? െ ൰߬ ൣ ௙ܴ௧ െ ߬൧ (26)
 ݍ௧ ൌ ܧ௧ൣܯ௧ǡଵሺݍ௧ାଵ ൅ ݀௧ାଵሻ൧ (27)
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aggregated dividends and consumption are highly sensitive to the level of the habit 
persistence.  With the exception of consumption and output, the relative volatility of all 
variables is substantially lower for the RA model than the VM model.  The effect of agency 
conflicts leads to a substantial reduction in the volatility of dividend payments, labor hours, 
investment, debt financing, the wage rate and salary.  For example, the RSD of dividends 
with ߦ ൌ 	 ? is 2.44 in the VM model but only 0.06 in the RA model. 
[Table 4] 
Despite this, the RA model provides conclusions that are consistent with our VM 
results in that the greater the habit motive the smoother the consumption and the more 
volatile the dividend payouts.  The RSD of dividend payments more than doubles from 0.06 
for ߦ ൌ 	 ? to 0.13 for ߦ ൌ 	 ?Ǥ	 ?, while consumption volatility almost halves over the same habit 
motive interval from 0.30 to 0.17.  This again indicates that the aggregate optimal payout 
policy is highly sensitive to investor preferences, which is our central finding. 
While dividends and consumption respond in similar ways to the changes in the habit 
motive in both the VM and RA models, this is not true for many of the other variables under 
consideration.  Investment, for example, becomes smoother with increased ߦ in the RA model, 
contrasting with the corresponding result in the VM model.  When the habit motive increases 
labor hours become more volatile in the RA model, while in the VM model the RSD of labor 
hours is largely insensitive to the habit motive.  Although the variation of the wage rate 
increases with stronger habit motive in both models, our results show that the representative 
households salary becomes smoother in the RA model while it gets more volatile in the VM 
model.   
Table 5 presents the cyclicality results for the RA model.  Consistent with the findings 
of Carceles-Poveda (2009) and Huang-Meier et al. (2015), optimal dividend policy is much 
less counter-cyclical in the RA case than the VM case.  The values of ܿ݋ݎݎሺ݀௧ ǡ ݕ௧ሻ are in all 
cases close to the range of -0.33 to +0.54 reported by Covas and Den Haan (2011), although 
remain somewhat less pro-cyclical than suggested by Jermann and Quadrini (2012).   
[Table 5] 
Consistent with the VM model, dividends become more counter-cyclical as the habit 
motive increases; or, more precisely in this case, change from being pro-cyclical for ߦ ൑ 	?Ǥ	? 
to counter-cyclical for ߦ ൒ 	 ?Ǥ	 ?.  Interestingly the effect is non-monotonic for the RA model, 
with dividends becoming slightly less counter-cyclical once ߦ  is greater than 0.6.  Most 
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importantly, our central finding that optimal aggregate dividend policy is highly sensitive to 
investor preferences is maintained for the RA case. 
There are some other notable differences between the RA and VM models.  In the RA 
case, consumption remains perfectly correlated with output for all values of ߦ considered.  So, 
while consumption becomes less volatile, it does not become less pro-cyclical in the RA case, 
which contrasts with the value maximizing model.  Labor hours, which are always highly 
pro-cyclical in the VM case, are always highly counter-cyclical in the RA case.  This implies 
that the representative investor takes some of the benefits from positive technological shocks 
through reduced working hours.  Despite this, salary remains highly pro-cyclical because of 
the increases in wages that results from better technology.  In the RA (VM) model, labor 
hours becomes less counter-cyclical (the cyclicality is largely unchanged) while the wage rate 
becomes less (more) pro-cyclical as the habit motive increases.  This leads to salaries 
becoming marginally less (marginally more) pro-cyclical as ߦ increases. 
The other key difference between the RA and VM models concerns the cyclicality of 
debt financing.  In the RA model, debt is almost uncorrelated with output, while in the VM 
model debt is strongly pro-cyclical for all values of ߦ considered.  It is the VM model that is 
more consistent with findings on the cyclicality of corporate debt reported by both Covas and 
Den Haan (2011) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012).  Therefore there is no strong reason to 
prefer either the VM or RA model over the other, but both give similar conclusions for the 
importance of aggregate dividends in maximizing investor welfare.   
Additionally, we calculate the partial derivatives of optimal aggregated dividends 
with respect to the capital share to output, consumption, labor, equity price and technology 
shock for both the VM and RA models in the case when the habit persistence equals 0.8.  We 
document the method and results in Appendix 4.  The results of the VM model indicate that 
consumption, capital input and labor working hours are negatively related to the optimal 
aggregated dividends while the share price and technology shock are positively related to the 
optimal aggregated dividends.  In order to maintain smooth consumption across time, the 
optimal aggregated dividends decrease to balance the investors overall income.  Unlike the 
VM model, the RA model implies a positive partial derivative between consumption and the 
optimal aggregated dividends.  In the RA model, the households consumption is positively 
related to labor.  
From Figs 4 and 5, we notice that aggregate dividends respond to technology shocks 
with a lag. It can also be seen that the deviation of consumption from the steady state appears 
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as an unexpected bump after the shock and then smooths over a ten quarter interval. 
Moreover, optimal consumption in the cases with and without habit motive has distinct 
impulse responses to technology shocks.  This phenomenon is also found in optimal 
investment. 
[Figure 4] 
[Figure 5] 
4 The US economy: the cyclical volatility correlation   
This section compares the implications of our models to several key features observed in the 
US economy over the period 1964Q2 to 2010Q1.  Specifically, we follow Jermann and 
Quadrini (2012) and collect quarterly financial data series from the Flow of Funds Accounts 
of the Federal Reserve Board (FFA) and economic data from National Income and Product 
Accounts (NIPA), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and the Current Employment 
Statistics (CES).    
A detailed definition for each series is: Equity payouts proxy for dividends (d) and are 
the sum of net dividends of nonfarm, nonfinancial and farm business (FFA codes 
FA106121075 and Z1/OTHER/FA136121073), minus the total of net increases in corporate 
nonfinancial business and proprietors net investment in nonfinancial business (FFA codes 
FA103164103 and FA112090205);  Consumption (c) is defined as real personal consumption 
expenditures (NIPA Table 1.1.6); GDP (y) is the total of real gross domestic product, from 
U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Labor income represents 
salary (s) and is defined as wages times working hours.  We use the data for real hourly 
compensation in the business sector (from BLS) for wages (w) and total private aggregate 
weekly hours (CES, national survey) for labor working hours (l); Capital expenditures are 
taken from nonfinancial business from FFA Table F.101, line 4 are the measure for 
investment (i); Debt (b) is the total liabilities in nonfinancial business (FA144190005).  All 
series are in billions of dollars and seasonally adjusted.  Following Jermann and Quadrini 
(2012) we deflate equity payouts, by business value added from NIPA (Table 1.3.5) and 
capital expenditures and debt by the price index for business value added from NIPA (Table 
1.3.4).  We also deflate consumption and GDP in the same manner as equity payouts and we 
deflate wages following the procedure for capital expenditures. 
 We report the mean and RSDs of these empirical series in the final columns of Tables 
2 and 4 and the correlations between series in Tables 3 and 5.  Overall, the implications of 
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our models are broadly consistent with the observed data.  Of particular importance for this 
paper, both models capture the observed negative correlation between consumption and 
dividends except in the case of low values of ߦ in the RA model.  They also both provide an 
explanation of the negative relationship between dividend and salary payments.   
The different models explain different features of the observed data.  The RA model 
with ȟ=0.3 captures many of the characteristics of the observed correlations and is, perhaps, 
the best fitting model.  This accurately represents the negative correlation between salary 
payments and dividends.  However, it cannot explain the behavior of either labor hours or 
debt.   As a consequence, as with other models, it also overestimates the importance of wages 
as a source of income.  More generally, the RA model does better than the VM model in 
capturing the variation of investment and the average levels of consumption and output.  By 
contrast, the VM model captures well the mean values of equity payouts and debt.  In 
addition, our VM model estimates that the correlation between dividends and debt, Corr(b,d), 
lies within the range -0.34 and -0.38, which is close to the figure of -0.40 for the empirical 
series.  It also more accurately captures the observed values of Corr(l,c) and Corr(b,c) 
compared to the RA model.   
Therefore, although neither model can fully capture all features of the observed 
economy, their implications are largely consistent with observed phenomenon.  The 
relationship between dividends and consumption predicted by the RA model with moderate 
values of habit formation accurately reflects the real-world behavior that is the specific focus 
of this study.   
5 Conclusions 
In this paper, we study business cyclical behaviors of aggregate activities by looking at the 
effect of investors preference. We demonstrate that dividends play a vital role in helping to 
isolate investors from the volatility of the business cycle both in the absence and presence of 
agency conflicts.  In particular, we show that optimal dividend payout policy has increasing 
relative standard deviation and becomes more negatively correlated with output as the habit 
motive increases.  This volatile and counter-cyclical stream of financial income helps 
counterbalance the highly pro-cyclical nature of salaries in economies when the habit motive 
is strong.   
Using a macroeconomic dynamic stochastic general equilibrium approach to study the 
relationship between aggregate dividend policy and investor utility, we provide a formal 
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theoretical framework to support the conjecture by Marsh and Merton (1987) that aggregate 
dividend policy remains relevant even when investors are less concerned about which 
individual firm services this demand for equity income.  Our study sheds light on the 
relationship between aggregate dividend policy and investor utility; an issue that has rarely 
been previously discussed in the standard corporate finance literature.  We believe that this 
opens a large number of areas for future research.  This work could be extended, for example, 
by examining optimal aggregate dividend and investment policy in an economy with 
irreversible investment.  
A further important potential extension would be to apply generalized method of 
moments (GMM) methods to estimate and test the moment conditions of this framework. 
This would follow in the path of a number of empirical studies, including Yogo (2006), who 
applies GMM to test the moment conditions of models that use durable consumption to 
explain expected stock returns.  Darrat et al. (2011) also use GMM to estimate and test their 
model that provides evidence of the existence of idiosyncratic consumption risk sharing 
across countries, while Savov (2011) implements a similar approach to test a consumption-
based capital asset pricing model that introduces garbage growth as a measure of 
consumption growth.  Verifying the robustness of our findings to these additional tests would 
provide further support to our conclusion that aggregate dividends play a vital role in helping 
investors optimally smooth their consumption paths. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Proof of eqs (17) to (21) (Equilibrium conditions for the economy 
environment including a representative household and a value-maximizing firm) 
First, the representative households optimal problem (eq. (2)) is solved by: 
subject to the budget constraint (eq. (3)) 
 The Lagrangian of the households optimal problem can be written as:  
where ߣ௧ା௛ is a Lagrangian multiplier. Solving for the first-order conditions yields: 
Substituting the Lagrangian multiplier ߣ௧  from eq. (A.2) into eq. (A.3), the wage rate for 
labor in supply is:  
Eq. (A.4) leads a standard Euler equation for the price of equity:  
 ௖೟ǡ௟೟ೞǡ௡೟ǡ௕೟ಹ෍ߚ௛ݑሺܿ௧ା௛ǡ ܿ௧ା௛ିଵǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈ା௛௦ ሻஶ௛ୀ଴   
 ܿ௧ ൅ ݍ௧݊௧ାଵ ൅ ܾ௧ு ൑ ݓ௧݈௧௦ ൅ ሺݍ௧ ൅ ݀௧ሻ݊௧ ൅ ௙ܴ௧ିଵܾ௧ିଵு   
 
ܮ ൌ ܧ௧ ൝෍ߚ௛ൣݑሺܿ௧ା௛ǡ ܿ௧ା௛ିଵǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈ା௛௦ ሻஶ௛ୀ଴ െ ߣ௧ା௛൫ܿ௧ା௛ ൅ ݍ௧ା௛݊௧ା௛ାଵ ൅ ܾ௧ା௛ு െݓ௧ା௛݈௧ା௛௦ െ ݍ௧ା௛݊௧ା௛െ ݀௧ା௛݊௧ା௛ െ ௙ܴ௧ା௛ିଵܾ௧ା௛ିଵ௛ ൯൧ ൡ  
(A.1) 
 
߲ܮ߲ܿ௧ ൌ 	 ? ֜ ߣ௧ ൌ ߲ݑሺܿ௧ ǡ ܿ௧ିଵǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈௦ሻ߲ܿ௧ ൅ ߚ ߲ݑሺܿ௧ାଵǡ ܿ௧ ǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈ାଵ௦ ሻ߲ܿ௧  (A.2) 
 
߲ܮ߲݈௧௦ ൌ 	 ? ߲֜ ݑሺܿ௧ ǡ ܿ௧ିଵǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈௦ሻ߲݈௧௦ ൅ ߣ௧ݓ௧ ൌ 	 ? (A.3) 
 
߲ܮ߲݊௧ ൌ 	 ? ֜ ݍ௧ ൌ ߚܧ௧ ൤൬ߣ௧ାଵߣ௧ ൰ ሺݍ௧ାଵ ൅ ݀௧ାଵሻ൨ (A.4) 
 
߲ܮ߲ܾ௧ு ൌ 	 ? ֜ߣ௧ ൌ ߚܧ௧ൣߣ௧ାଵ ௙ܴ௧൧  (A.5) 
 ݓ௧ ൌ െ ߲ݑሺܿ௧ ǡ ܿ௧ିଵǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈௦ሻ߲݈௧௦߲ݑሺܿ௧ ǡ ܿ௧ିଵǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈௦ሻ߲ܿ௧ ൅ ߚ ߲ݑሺܿ௧ାଵǡ ܿ௧ ǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈ାଵ௦ ሻ߲ܿ௧  (A.6) 
 ݍ௧ ൌ ܧ௧ൣܯ௧ǡଵሺݍ௧ାଵ ൅ ݀௧ାଵሻ൧  ܯ௧ǡଵ ൌ ߚሺߣ௧ାଵߣ௧ ሻ (A.7) 
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where ܯ௧ǡଵ  is defined as the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution with respect to 
consumption.   
Rewriting eq. (A.5) with ܯ௧ǡଵ, we obtain the the standard Euler equation: 
So that the above eqs (A.6), (A.7), and (A.8) are the households optimal first order 
conditions.  
 
Next, we solve the representative firms optimal problem (eq. (14)):  
subject to the constraints of the capital function (eq. (7)) and dividends to shareholders (eq. 
(9)): 
The Lagrangian of the firms optimization problem can be written as:  
Differentiating eq. (A.10) with respect to ݈௧ௗ , ݇௧ and ܾ௧and setting the values each time to 
zero yields: 
 
	 ? ൌ ܧ௧ൣܯ௧ǡଵ ௙ܴ௧൧ (A.8) 
 ௟೟೏ǡ௞೟ǡ௕೟ ݀௧ ൅ ܧ௧ ൥෍ܯ௧ǡ௛݀௧ା௛ஶ௛ୀଵ ൩  
݀௧ ൌ ሺ	 ? െ ሻ߬ ቂ݇௧ିଵఈ ൫ݖ௧݈௧ௗ൯ଵିఈ െ ݓ௧݈௧ௗ െ ܴ௧ିଵܾ௧ିଵቃ െ ߬ ܾ௧ିଵ ൅ ܾ௧ െ ݇௧ ൅ ሺ	 ? െ ߟሻ݇௧ିଵ (A.9) 
 
ܮ ൌ ሺ	 ? െ ሻ߬ ቂ݇௧ିଵఈ ൫ݖ௧݈௧ௗ൯ଵିఈ െݓ௧݈௧ௗ െ ܴ௧ିଵܾ௧ିଵቃ െ ߬ ܾ௧ିଵ ൅ ܾ௧ െ ݇௧൅ ሺ	 ? െ ߟሻ݇௧ିଵ൅ ܧ௧ ൝෍ܯ௧ǡ௛ሺ	 ? െ ሻ߬ ቂ݇௧ିଵା௛ఈ ൫ݖ௧ା௛݈௧ା௛ௗ ൯ଵିఈ െݓ௧ା௛݈௧ା௛ௗஶ௛ୀଵെ ܴ௧ିଵା௛ܾ௧ିଵା௛ቃ െ ߬ ܾ௧ିଵା௛ ൅ ܾ௧ା௛ െ ݇௧ା௛ ൅ ሺ	 ? െ ߟሻ݇௧ିଵା௛ൡ 
(A.10) 
 
߲ܮ߲݈௧ௗ ൌ 	 ? ֜ ݓ௧ ൌ ሺ	 ? െ ߙሻ݇௧ିଵఈ ሺݖ௧ሻଵିఈ݈௧ି ఈ ֜ ݓ௧ ൌ ሺ	 ? െ ߙሻݕ௧݈௧  (A.11) 
 
߲ܮ߲݇௧ ൌ 	 ? ֜ 	 ? ൌ ܧ௧ ቄܯ௧ǡଵሼሾሺ	 ? െ ሻ߬ߙ ݇௧ఈିଵሺݖ௧ାଵ݈௧ାଵሻଵିఈሿ ൅ 	 ? െ ߟሽቅ (A.12) 
 
߲ܮ߲ܾ௧ ൌ 	 ? ֜ 	 ? ൌ ܧ௧൛ܯ௧ǡଵሾሺ	 ? െ ሻܴ߬௧ ൅ ߬ሿൟ (A.13) 
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Using eqs (A.6) to (A.8) and (A.11) to (A.13), we can derive the value-maximizing models 
equilibrium conditions.  Specifically, using eqs (A.6) and (A.11), the optimal wage rate for 
labor takes the following form: 
Using eqs (A.8) and (A.12), we get: 
Using eqs (A.8) and (A.13), the relationship between the risk-free interest rate and the 
corporate interest rate is:  
For the price of equity, we rewrite eq. (A.7) here:  
So that eqs (A.14) to (A.18) are the equilibrium conditions eqs (17) to (21) shown in Section 
2.1.5.  We show a specific form of  ܯ௧ǡଵ in Appendix 2. 
 
Appendix 2: The intertemporal marginal rate of substitution with consumption, ࡹ 
In eq. (A.7), we define the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in the following form:  
From eq. (A.2), we know that: 
Substituting eqs (A.20) and (A.21) into eq. (A.19): 
 
 ሺ	 ? െ ߙሻ ݕ௧݈௧ ൌ െ ߲ݑሺܿ௧ ǡ ܿ௧ିଵǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈௦ሻ߲݈௧௦߲ݑሺܿ௧ ǡ ܿ௧ିଵǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈௦ሻ߲ܿ௧ ൅ ߚ ߲ݑሺܿ௧ାଵǡ ܿ௧ ǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈ାଵ௦ ሻ߲ܿ௧  (A.14) 
	 ? ൌ ܧ௧ൣܯ௧ǡଵ ௙ܴ௧൧ (A.15) 
௙ܴ௧ ൌ ሺ	 ? െ ሻ߬ߙ݇௧ఈିଵሺݖ௧ାଵ݈௧ାଵሻଵିఈ ൅ 	 ? െ ߟ (A.16) 
௙ܴ௧ ൌ ሺ	 ? െ ሻܴ߬௧ ൅ ߬ ֜ ܴ௧ ൌ ൬ 	?	 ? െ ൰߬ ൣ ௙ܴ௧ െ ߬൧ (A.17) 
ݍ௧ ൌ ܧ௧ൣܯ௧ǡଵሺݍ௧ାଵ ൅ ݀௧ାଵሻ൧ (A.18) 
ܯ௧ǡଵ ؠ ߚ ߣ௧ାଵߣ௧  (A.19) 
ߣ௧ ൌ ߲ݑሺܿ௧ ǡ ܿ௧ିଵǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈௦ሻ߲ܿ௧ ൅ ߚ ߲ݑሺܿ௧ାଵǡ ܿ௧ ǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈ାଵ௦ ሻ߲ܿ௧  
 
(A.20) 
ߣ௧ାଵ ൌ ߲ݑሺܿ௧ାଵǡ ܿ௧ ǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈ାଵ௦ ሻ߲ܿ௧ାଵ ൅ ߚ ߲ݑሺܿ௧ାଶǡ ܿ௧ାଵǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈ାଶ௦ ሻ߲ܿ௧ାଵ  
 
(A.21) 
ܯ௧ǡ௛ ؠ ߚ௛ ߣ௧ା௛ߣ௧ ൌ ߚ௛ ߲ݑሺܿ௧ା௛ǡ ܿ௧ା௛ିଵǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈ା௛
௦ ሻ߲݈௧௦ ൅ ߲ݑሺܿ௧ା௛ାଵǡ ܿ௧ା௛ǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈ା௛ାଵ௦ ሻ߲݈௧௦߲ݑሺܿ௧ ǡ ܿ௧ିଵǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈௦ሻ߲ܿ௧ ൅ ߚ ߲ݑሺܿ௧ାଵǡ ܿ௧ ǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈ାଵ௦ ሻ߲ܿ௧  (A.22) 
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Next, we apply the households momentary utility function to eq. (A.22).  We assume that 
household utility is determined by the multiplied effect of consumption and leisure, which 
can be written as: 
With the given momentary utility function, we calculate ߲ݑ௧Ȁܿ௧, ߲ݑ௧ାଵȀܿ௧, ߲ݑ௧Ȁ݈௧, ߲ݑ௧ାଵȀܿ௧ାଵ, ߲ݑ௧ାଶȀܿ௧ାଵ, ߣ௧ and ߣ௧ାଵ: 
Finally, the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution with consumption can be written as: 
 
Appendix 3: Proof of eqs (23) to (27) (Equilibrium conditions for the economy 
environment including a representative household and a risk-averse firm) 
This appendix obtains equilibrium conditions when the firm no longer maximizes 
shareholders value but instead possesses its own risk aversion characteristic.   
The households maximization preference does not change and therefore the first order 
conditions for the households problem remain the same as in the case of the value-
maximization model as given in eqs (A.6), (A.7), and (A.8).  
To solve the risk-averse firms problem (eq. (22)): 
 ݑሺܿ௧ ǡ ܿ௧ିଵǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈ሻ ൌ ሾሺܿ௧ െ ߦ ܿ௧ିଵሻఘሺ	 ? െ ௧݈ሻଵିఘሿଵିఊ	 ? െ ߛ (A.23)
߲ݑ௧߲ܿ௧ ൌ ሾሺܿ௧ െ ߦܿ௧ିଵሻఘሺ	 ? െ ௧݈ሻଵିఘሿିఊሾߩሺܿ௧ െ ߦ ܿ௧ିଵሻఘିଵሺ	 ? െ ௧݈ሻଵିఘሿ (A.24)߲ݑ௧ାଵ߲ܿ௧ ൌ ሾሺܿ௧ାଵ െ ߦܿ௧ሻఘሺ	 ? െ ௧݈ାଵሻଵିఘሿିఊ ሾሺെߦሻߩሺܿ௧ାଵ െ ߦ ܿ௧ሻఘିଵሺ	 ? െ ௧݈ାଵሻଵିఘሿ (A.25)߲ݑ௧߲݈௧ ൌ ሾሺܿ௧ െ ߦܿ௧ିଵሻఘሺ	 ? െ ௧݈ሻଵିఘሿିఊሾሺെ	?ሻሺ	? െ ߩሻሺܿ௧ െ ߦ ܿ௧ିଵሻఘሺ	 ? െ ௧݈ሻିఘሿ (A.26)߲ݑ௧ାଵ߲ܿ௧ାଵ ൌ ሾሺܿ௧ାଵ െ ߦܿ௧ሻఘሺ	 ? െ ௧݈ାଵሻଵିఘሿିఊ ሾߩሺܿ௧ାଵ െ ߦ ܿ௧ሻఘିଵሺ	 ? െ ௧݈ାଵሻଵିఘሿ (A.27)߲ݑ௧ାଶ߲ܿ௧ାଵ ൌ ሾሺܿ௧ାଶ െ ߦܿ௧ାଵሻఘሺ	 ? െ ௧݈ାଶሻଵିఘሿିఊ ሾሺെߦሻߩሺܿ௧ାଶ െ ߦ ܿ௧ାଵሻఘିଵሺ	 ? െ ௧݈ାଶሻଵିఘሿ (A.28)ߣ௧ ൌ ߲ݑ௧߲ܿ௧ ൅ ߚ ߲ݑ௧ାଵ߲ܿ௧  (A.29)ߣ௧ାଵ ൌ ߲ݑ௧ାଵ߲ܿ௧ାଵ ൅ ߚ ߲ݑ௧ାଶ߲ܿ௧ାଵ  (A.30)
ܯ௧ǡଵ ؠ ߚ ߣ௧ାଵߣ௧ ൌ ߚۉۈ
ۇ	 ? െ ሾߦߚ ቀܿ௧ାଶ െ ߦܿ௧ାଵܿ௧ାଵ െ ߦܿ௧ ቁିఊఘାఘିଵ ቀ	 ? െ ௧݈ାଶ	 ? െ ௧݈ାଵቁିఊሺଵିఘሻାଵିఘቈቀܿ௧ െ ߦܿ௧ିଵܿ௧ାଵ െ ߦܿ௧ቁିఊఘାఘିଵ ቀ 	 ? െ ௧݈	 ? െ ௧݈ାଵ ቁିఊሺଵିఘሻାଵିఘ቉ െ ߦߚ یۋ
ۊ (A.31)
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subject to the constraint of dividends to shareholders (eq. (9), where ݅ is replaced by eq. (7)): 
Setting the partial derivatives of the firms objective function with respect to ݈, ݇, and ܾ all 
equal to zero, the first order conditions for the firms problem are: 
The above eqs (A.34) to (A.36) are the risk-averse firms optimal conditions. 
The next step is to tidy up the six first order conditions (eqs (A.6) to (A.8) and (A.34) to 
(A.36)).  From eqs (A.6) and (A.34), we know that the optimal wage rate for labor takes the 
following form: 
From eqs (A.8) and (A.35): 
where ߶ ቀ ௗ೟ௗ೟శభቁఊಷ can be regarded as being the equivalent to ܯ௧ǡଵ from the value-maximizing 
model.  
Using eqs (A.8) and (A.36), we can obtain the relationship between the risk-free interest rate 
and the corporate interest rate in the absence of bankruptcy:  
For the price of equity, we repeat eq. (A.7) here:  
 ௟೟೏ǡ௞೟ǡ௕೟ ܧ௧ ൤	? ߶௛ஶ௛ୀଵ ௗ೟శ೓భషംಷିଵଵିఊಷ ൨  (A.32) 
݀௧ ൌ ሺ	 ? െ ሻ߬ ቂ݇௧ିଵఈ ൫ݖ௧݈௧ௗ൯ଵିఈ െ ݓ௧݈௧ௗ െ ܴ௧ିଵܾ௧ିଵቃ െ ߬ ܾ௧ିଵ ൅ ܾ௧ െ ݇௧ ൅ ሺ	 ? െ ߟሻ݇௧ିଵ (A.33) 
 
߲ܮ߲݈௧ௗ ൌ 	 ? ֜ ݓ௧ ൌ ሺ	 ? െ ߙሻ݇௧ିଵఈ ሺݖ௧ሻଵିఈ݈௧ି ఈ ֜ ݓ௧݈௧ ൌ ሺ	 ? െ ߙሻݕ௧ (A.34) 
 
߲ܮ߲݇௧ ൌ 	 ? ֜ 	 ? ൌ ߶ܧ௧ ൝൬ ݀௧݀௧ାଵ൰ఊಷ ሼሾሺ	 ? െ ሻ߬ߙ ݇௧ఈିଵሺݖ௧ାଵ݈௧ାଵሻଵିఈሿ ൅ 	 ? െ ߟሽൡ (A.35) 
 
߲ܮ߲ܾ௧ ൌ 	 ? ֜ 	 ? ൌ ߶ܧ௧ ቊ൬ ݀௧݀௧ାଵ൰ఊಷ ሾሺ	 ? െ ሻܴ߬௧ ൅ ߬ሿቋ (A.36) 
 ሺ	 ? െ ߙሻ ݕ௧݈௧ ൌ െ ߲ݑሺܿ௧ ǡ ܿ௧ିଵǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈௦ሻ߲݈௧௦߲ݑሺܿ௧ ǡ ܿ௧ିଵǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈௦ሻ߲ܿ௧ ൅ ߚ ߲ݑሺܿ௧ାଵǡ ܿ௧ ǡ 	 ? െ ௧݈ାଵ௦ ሻ߲ܿ௧  (A.37) 
	 ? ൌ ߶ܧ௧ ቈ൬ ݀௧݀௧ାଵ൰ఊಷ ௙ܴ௧቉ (A.38) ௙ܴ௧ ൌ ሺ	 ? െ ሻ߬ߙ݇௧ఈିଵሺݖ௧ାଵ݈௧ାଵሻଵିఈ ൅ 	 ? െ ߟ (A.39) 
௙ܴ௧ ൌ ሺ	 ? െ ሻܴ߬௧ ൅ ߬ ֜ ܴ௧ ൌ ൬ 	?	 ? െ ൰߬ ൣ ௙ܴ௧ െ ߬൧ (A.40) 
ݍ௧ ൌ ܧ௧ൣܯ௧ǡଵሺݍ௧ାଵ ൅ ݀௧ାଵሻ൧ (A.41)
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So that eqs (A.37) to (A.41) are the equilibrium conditions eqs (23) to (27) shown in Section 
3.  The variable ܯ௧ǡଵ includes the households utility function with habit formation; refer to 
Appendix 2 for details. 
 
Appendix 4: The partial derivatives of dividends with respect to explanatory variables 
Consider the optimal aggregated dividend as a linear function of underlying variables: ݀ ൌ ܽ଴ ൅ ܽଵ݇ ൅ ܽଶܿ ൅ ܽଷ݈ ൅ ܽସݍ ൅ ܽହݖ 
To derive the partial derivative of dividends with respect to each variable, we first construct a 
5-vector of the covariance of each explanatory variable with ݀; ܻ ൌ ܥ݋ݒሺ݀ǡ ݔሻ.  We also 
construct a variance-covariance matrix of all explanatory variables, ܺ, with the ith row given 
by ܥ݋ݒሺݔ் ǡ ݔ௜ሻ, and a 5-vector, ܽǡwith elements ܽ௜ that denote the partial derivatives:   ܥ݋ݒሺ݀ǡ ݔ௜ሻ ൌ ܥ݋ݒሺܽ଴ ൅ ܽଵ݇ ൅ ܽଶܿ ൅ ܽଷ݈ ൅ ܽସݍ ൅ ܽହݖǡ ݔ௜ሻ 
ฺ ܥ݋ݒሺ݀ǡ ݔ௜ሻ ൌ෍ ௝ܽܥ݋ݒሺݔ௝ ǡ ݔ௜ሻହ௝ୀଵ  ฺ ܻ ൌ ܺܽ ฺ ܽ ൌ ܺିଵܻ 
We calculate the partial derivative of the optimal aggregated dividends with respect to capital 
input (݇), consumption (c), labor (l), equity price (q) and technology shock (z) for the VM 
model and the RA model in the case of habit persistence of 0.8: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model VM RA ߲݀Ȁ߲݇ -0.212 0.002 ߲݀Ȁ߲ܿ  -1.796  0.144 ߲݀Ȁ߲݈  -9.600  0.102 ߲݀Ȁ߲ݍ  0.436  0.002 ߲݀Ȁ߲ݖ  1.132  -0.082 
30 

 
 
Fig. 1. Sensitivity of aggregate dividends and consumption to the habit motive 
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Fig. 2. The impulse responses of optimal aggregate dividends (݀), consumption (ܿ), debt 
(ܾ), and investment (݅) in the case without habit persistence for the VM model (ߦ ൌ 	?) 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. The impulse responses of optimal aggregate dividends (݀), consumption (ܿ), debt 
(ܾ), and investment (݅) in the case with habit persistence for the VM model (ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?) 
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Fig. 4. The impulse responses of optimal aggregate dividends (݀), consumption (ܿ), debt 
(ܾ), and investment (݅) in the case without habit persistence for the RA model (ߦ ൌ 	?) 
 
 
 
 
Fig.  5. The impulse responses of optimal aggregate dividends (݀), consumption (ܿ), debt 
(ܾ), and investment (݅) in the case with habit persistence for the RA model (ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?) 
 
  
33 

Table 1. Calibration values for the models parameters 
 Parameters Notation Value 
1 Capital share to output ߙ 0.35 
2 Depreciation ratio ߟ 0.019 
3 Subjective time discount factor ߚ 0.99 
4 Persistence of the technology shock ߰ 0.95 
5 Standard deviation of the technology shock ߪߝ 0.00712 
6 Recovery rate ߠ 0.92
7 Tax rate ߬ 0.06 
8 Time allocated to market activities ߩ 0.36 
9 Coefficient of relative risk aversion of the household ߛ 2 
10 Upper bound ܷ 1.225 
11 Lower bound ܮ 0.475 
12 Habit persistence ߦ Given 
This table displays a summary of parameter values. Rows 1-7 are taken from Alessandrini (2003). Row 8 
is taken from Campbell (1994). Rows 9 - 11 are values commonly used in literature. Habit persistence is 
allowed to take a range of different values from 0 to 0.8 with an interval of 10%. 
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Table 2. Mean and relative standard deviation (RSD in %) for the VM model and the US 
economy 
 ߦ U.S. 
Economy 
 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
Panel A: Mean ݀ 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.02 ܿ 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.94 1.91 ݕ 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.21 1.22 3.06 ݈ 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 2.39 ݅ 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 9.05 ܾ 5.40 5.40 5.41 5.41 5.42 5.43 5.45 5.48 5.54 5.23 ݓ 27.38 27.36 27.33 27.30 27.25 27.19 27.10 26.95 26.66 1.46 ݏ 8.84 8.84 8.84 8.84 8.84 8.84 8.84 8.84 8.84 3.24 
Panel B: Relative standard deviation (RSD) in % ݀ 2.44 2.42 2.42 2.44 2.49 2.59 2.73 2.94 3.21 1.37 ܿ 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.21 1.80 ݕ 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 1.69 ݈ 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.21 ݅ 2.66 2.69 2.73 2.77 2.83 2.90 2.99 3.10 3.22 0.40 ܾ 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.87 ݓ 2.87 2.86 2.87 2.90 2.97 3.07 3.22 3.43 3.71 0.40 ݏ 3.17 3.17 3.19 3.23 3.29 3.40 3.55 3.76 4.03 0.19 
The table reports the mean and the relative standard deviations (%) of aggregate dividends (d), consumption (c), labor 
(l), output (y), capital (k), investment (i), debt (d), wages rate (w) and salary (s), generated from the value-maximizing 
model. ߦ  is persistence of habit in consumption. The extended equilibrium model is incorporated with aggregate 
dividend policy and with different values of habit persistence. All data are detrended by Hodrick and Prescott filter 
(HP filter). The multiplier of the HP filter is 1600. For U.S. economy, we collect quarterly financial data from the Flow 
of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve Board (FFA) and economic data from National Income and Product 
Accounts (NIPA), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the Current Employment Statistics (CES) for equity 
payout, consumption and labor income series from 1964(Q2) to 2010(Q1).  Equity payouts are the sum of net 
dividends of nonfarm, nonfinancial and farm business (FFA codes FA106121075 and Z1/OTHER/FA136121073), 
minus the total of net increase in corporate nonfinancial business and proprietors net investment of nonfinancial 
business (FFA codes FA103164103 and FA112090205).  Consumption is defined as real personal consumption 
expenditures (NIPA Table 1.1.6).   GDP is the measure of output and is the total of real gross domestic product, from 
U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Labor income is defined as wages times working 
hours, which is real hourly compensation in the business sector (from BLS) multiplied by total private aggregate 
weekly hours (CES, national survey). Capital expenditures in nonfinancial business from FFA Table F.101, line 4 are 
the measure for investment. Debt is the total liabilities in nonfinancial business (FA144190005).  All series are in 
billions of dollars and seasonally adjusted.  Equity payouts, consumption and GDP are deflated by business value 
added from NIPA (Table 1.3.5). Wages, capital expenditures and debt are deflated by the price index for business 
value added from NIPA (Table 1.3.4). 
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Table 3. Cross-correlations of real variables (VM model and the US economy) ܥ݋ݎݎሺǤ ǡ ܿ௧ሻ  ሺݕ௧ ǡ ܿ௧ሻ ሺ݈௧ǡ ௧ ሻ ሺ݅௧ ǡ ܿ௧ ሻ ሺ݀௧ ǡ ܿ௧ ሻ ሺܾ௧ ǡ ܿ௧ ሻ ሺݓ௧ǡ ܿ௧ሻ ሺݏ௧ ǡ ܿ௧ ሻߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  0.97 0.93 0.95 -0.72 0.58 0.80 0.83 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  0.96 0.92 0.93 -0.77 0.62 0.84 0.87 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  0.94 0.89 0.90 -0.81 0.65 0.87 0.89 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  0.92 0.87 0.86 -0.84 0.69 0.88 0.90 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  0.89 0.83 0.81 -0.83 0.74 0.87 0.88 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  0.85 0.78 0.75 -0.80 0.79 0.84 0.84 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  0.78 0.70 0.67 -0.74 0.85 0.77 0.77 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  0.70 0.60 0.56 -0.64 0.91 0.67 0.67 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  0.57 0.45 0.42 -0.50 0.97 0.53 0.52 
U.S. Economy  1.00 0.97 0.96 -0.20 0.60 0.97 1.00 ܥ݋ݎݎሺǤ ǡ ݀௧ሻ  ሺܿ௧ ǡ ݀௧ሻ ሺݕ௧ǡ ݀௧ ሻ ሺ݈௧ ǡ ݀௧ ሻ ሺ݅௧ ǡ ݀௧ ሻ ሺܾ௧ ǡ ݀௧ ሻ ሺݓ௧ǡ ݀௧ሻ ሺݏ௧ ǡ ݀௧ሻ ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  -0.72 -0.71 -0.69 -0.70 -0.38 -0.99 -0.98 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  -0.77 -0.74 -0.72 -0.71 -0.38 -0.99 -0.98 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  -0.81 -0.76 -0.74 -0.73 -0.38 -0.99 -0.98 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  -0.84 -0.79 -0.77 -0.74 -0.37 -0.99 -0.98 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  -0.83 -0.81 -0.80 -0.76 -0.37 -0.99 -0.99 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  -0.80 -0.82 -0.82 -0.78 -0.36 -1.00 -0.99 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  -0.74 -0.83 -0.83 -0.80 -0.35 -1.00 -0.99 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  -0.64 -0.84 -0.84 -0.82 -0.34 -1.00 -0.99 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  -0.50 -0.85 -0.85 -0.84 -0.34 -1.00 -0.99 
U.S. Economy  -0.20 -0.20 -0.22 -0.30 -0.40 -0.22 -0.21 ܥ݋ݎݎሺǤ ǡ ݕ௧ሻ  ሺܿ௧ ǡ ݕ௧ሻ ሺ݈௧ǡ ݕ௧ ሻ ሺ݅௧ ǡ ݕ௧ ሻ ሺ݀௧ ǡ ݕ௧ ሻ ሺܾ௧ ǡ ݕ௧ ሻ ሺݓ௧ǡ ݕ௧ሻ ሺݏ௧ ǡ ݕ௧ ሻ ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  0.97 0.99 1.00 -0.71  0.37 0.79 0.84 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  0.96 0.99 1.00 -0.74 0.38 0.81 0.85 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  0.94 0.99 0.99 -0.76 0.39 0.83 0.87 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  0.92 0.99 0.99 -0.79 0.40 0.85 0.88 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  0.89 0.99 0.99 -0.81 0.41 0.86 0.89 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  0.85 0.99 0.99 -0.82 0.42 0.87 0.90 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  0.78 0.99 0.99 -0.83 0.44 0.88 0.90 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  0.70 0.99 0.98 -0.84 0.45 0.89 0.90 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  0.57 0.99 0.99 -0.85 0.44 0.89 0.90 
U.S. Economy  1.00 0.98 0.96 -0.20 0.61 0.97 1.00 
The table reports the cross-correlations of output (ݕ), consumption (ܿ), labor (݈), investment (݅), dividends (݀), debt 
(ܾ), wage rate (ݓ) and salary (ݏ) of the VM model by varying the habit persistence parameter value from 0.0 (without 
habit) to 0.8 (high level of habit persistence). The multiplier of the HP filter is 1600.  U.S data series defined in the 
note to Table 2. 
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Table 4. Mean and relative standard deviation (RSD in %) for the RA model 
 ߦ 
U.S. 
Economy  0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
Panel A: Mean ݀ 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.02 ܿ 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.96 1.96 1.97 1.91 ݕ 2.54 2.54 2.55 2.55 2.55 2.55 2.55 2.56 2.57 3.06 ݈ 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.70 2.39 ݅ 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 9.05 ܾ 11.52 11.52 11.52 11.53 11.53 11.54 11.55 11.57 11.61 5.23 ݓ 12.73 12.73 12.72 12.72 12.71 12.70 12.69 12.67 12.62 1.46 ݏ 8.77 8.77 8.77 8.77 8.77 8.77 8.77 8.77 8.77 3.24 
Panel B: Relative standard deviation (RSD) in % ݀ 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.13 1.37 ܿ  0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.17 1.80 ݕ  0.37 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.26 0.21 1.69 ݈  0.37 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.45 0.51 0.59 0.70 0.21 ݅  0.58 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.51 0.48 0.42 0.33 0.40 ܾ  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.87 ݓ  0.74 0.75 0.76 0.78 0.80 0.84 0.88 0.92 0.95 0.40 ݏ  0.38 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.34 0.27 0.19 
The table reports the mean and the relative standard deviations (%) of aggregate dividends (d), consumption (c), labor 
(l), output (y), capital (k), investment (i), debt (d), wages rate (w) and salary (s), generated from the risk-averse model. ߦ is persistence of habit in consumption. The extended equilibrium model is incorporated with aggregate dividend 
policy and with different values of habit persistence. All data are detrended by Hodrick and Prescott filter (HP filter). 
The multiplier of the HP filter is 1600.  U.S data series defined in the note to Table 2.  
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Table 5. Cross-correlations of real variables (RA model) ܥ݋ݎݎሺǤ ǡ ܿ௧ሻ  ሺݕ௧ǡ ܿ௧ሻ ሺ݈௧ ǡ ௧ ሻ ሺ݅௧ ǡ ܿ௧ ሻ ሺ݀௧ ǡ ܿ௧ ሻ ሺܾ௧ ǡ ܿ௧ሻ ሺݓ௧ǡ ܿ௧ሻ ሺݏ௧ ǡ ܿ௧ ሻߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  1.00 -1.00 1.00 0.20 -0.01 1.00 0.98 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  1.00 -1.00 1.00 0.12 -0.01 0.99 0.98 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  1.00 -1.00 1.00 0.03 -0.01 0.99 0.97 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  1.00 -0.98 1.00 -0.05 -0.02 0.97 0.96 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  1.00 -0.96 1.00 -0.10 -0.02 0.95 0.94 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  1.00 -0.91 1.00 -0.13 -0.01 0.91 0.92 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  1.00 -0.82 1.00 -0.13 -0.01 0.86 0.90 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  1.00 -0.71 1.00 -0.12 0.00 0.78 0.88 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  1.00 -0.58 1.00 -0.10 0.01 0.67 0.87 
U.S. Economy  1.00 0.97 0.96 -0.20 0.60 0.97 1.00 ܥ݋ݎݎሺǤ ǡ ݀௧ሻ  ሺܿ௧ǡ ݀௧ሻ ሺݕ௧ ǡ ݀௧ ሻ ሺ݈௧ ǡ ݀௧ ሻ ሺ݅௧ ǡ ݀௧ ሻ ሺܾ௧ ǡ ݀௧ሻ ሺݓ௧ǡ ݀௧ሻ ሺݏ௧ ǡ ݀௧ሻ ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  0.20 0.18 -0.20 0.16 0.75 0.11 0.02 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  0.12 0.10 -0.09 0.08 0.71 0.00 -0.08 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  0.03 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.67 -0.13 -0.20 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  -0.05 -0.06 0.22 -0.08 0.64 -0.27 -0.32 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  -0.10 -0.11 0.38 -0.13 0.61 -0.40 -0.43 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  -0.13 -0.14 0.53 -0.15 0.60 -0.52 -0.51 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  -0.13 -0.14 0.67 -0.16 0.62 -0.62 -0.56 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  -0.12 -0.13 0.78 -0.15 0.65 -0.72 -0.59 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  -0.10 -0.11 0.86 -0.12 0.69 -0.80 -0.58 
U.S. Economy  -0.20 -0.20 -0.22 -0.30 -0.40 -0.22 -0.21 ܥ݋ݎݎሺǤ ǡ ݕ௧ሻ  ሺܿ௧ǡ ݕ௧ሻ ሺ݈௧ ǡ ݕ௧ ሻ ሺ݅௧ ǡ ݕ௧ ሻ ሺ݀௧ ǡ ݕ௧ ሻ ሺܾ௧ ǡ ݕ௧ሻ ሺݓ௧ ǡ ݕ௧ሻ ሺݏ௧ ǡ ݕ௧ ሻ ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  1.00 -1.00 1.00 0.18 -0.03 1.00 0.99 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  1.00 -1.00 1.00 0.10 -0.03 0.99 0.98 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  1.00 -1.00 1.00 0.02 -0.03 0.99 0.98 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  1.00 -0.99 1.00 -0.06 -0.03 0.98 0.96 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  1.00 -0.96 1.00 -0.11 -0.03 0.95 0.95 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  1.00 -0.91 1.00 -0.14 -0.03 0.92 0.92 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  1.00 -0.83 1.00 -0.14 -0.03 0.96 0.90 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  1.00 -0.72 1.00 -0.13 -0.02 0.79 0.88 ߦ ൌ 	?Ǥ	?  1.00 -0.59 1.00 -0.11 -0.01 0.68 0.87 
U.S. Economy  1.00 0.98 0.96 -0.20 0.61 0.97 1.00 
The table reports the cross-correlations of output (ݕ), consumption (ܿ), labor (݈), investment (݅), dividends (݀), debt 
(ܾ), wage rate (ݓ) and salary (ݏ) of the RA model by varying the habit persistence parameter value from 0.0 (without 
habit) to 0.8 (high level of habit persistence). The multiplier of the HP filter is 1600. U.S data series defined in the 
note to Table 2. 
 
